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Can public insurance through redistributive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy
in which private risk sharing is limited? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction
that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is incomplete because some insurance
markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley, 1986 and Aiyagari, 1994) publicly
provided risk sharing via a tax system generally improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private
insurance markets exist but their use is limited by the absence of complete enforcement (as in Kehoe
and Levine, 1993 and Kocherlakota, 1996) then the provision of public insurance can crowd out private
insurance to such an extent that total consumption insurance is reduced. By reducing income risk the
tax system increases the value of being excluded from private insurance markets and hence weakens
the enforcement mechanism of these contracts. In this paper we theoretically characterize and numerically
compute equilibria in an economy with limited enforcement and a continuum of agents facing realistic
income risk and tax systems with various degrees of risk reduction (progressivity). We find that the
crowding-out effect of public insurance on private insurance in the limited enforcement model can















Should the government provide public insurance against idiosyncratic income uncertainty by implementing a
progressive tax system in which households with higher income realizations pay higher average tax rates, thus
making the after-tax labor income process less risky than the pre-tax labor income process? The answer that
economic theory gives to this question depends on the assumptions about the structure of private insurance
markets. If these markets are complete, in that agents can trade a complete set of perfectly enforceable
insurance contracts, then complete risk sharing is achieved via private markets and progressive income taxes
provide no additional insurance. If, on the other hand, private insurance markets do not implement full risk
sharing redistributive taxes might generate welcome additional insurance. As Mirrlees (1974), Varian (1980)
and others have pointed out, this benecial eect of progressive income taxes has to be traded o against
the adverse eect on incentives to supply labor and to accumulate capital, leading to a nontrivial optimal
taxation problem.2
In this paper we demonstrate that if one models the frictions that lead to incomplete risk sharing in the
rst place explicitly, then the public provision of insurance may adversely aect the way private insurance
markets work. Our main substantive contribution is to show that if private risk sharing is limited because
private insurance contracts can only be enforced through exclusion from participating in nancial markets
in the future, then the provision of public insurance crowds out the provision of private insurance against
idiosyncratic uncertainty, potentially more than one for one. That is, by attempting to better insure house-
holds against idiosyncratic risk the government achieves exactly the opposite, namely a worse risk allocation
of private consumption.
Our exact modelling approach follows the work by Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001) and Kocherlakota
(1996) and does not impose a priori restrictions on the set of private insurance contracts that can be traded.
These contracts, however, can not be fully enforced.3 The only enforcement mechanism is the threat of
exclusion from future credit and insurance markets upon default. Tax liabilities, however, are not subject
to this enforcement problem as we assume that the penalty for defaulting on tax payments can be made
prohibitively large by the government. If agents default on their private debt, they are banned from future
credit and insurance markets, but retain their private (labor) endowment which is still subject to income
taxation. A change in the tax system changes the severity of punishment from default by altering the utility
an agent can attain without access to insurance markets and thus changes the extent of enforcement of
private contracts. Since enforcement denes the extent through which private contracts are used, a change
2A second common justication for redistributive taxation is the social desire to attain a more equal income or wealth (and
hence consumption and welfare) distribution. Although we believe that this justication is potentially important we will not
address this point in this paper. See the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971) for an analysis of the trade-o between the equity
and the labor supply incentive eect of redistributive taxation.
3Another fraction of the literature derives market incompleteness from informational frictions underlying the phenomena
of adverse selection and moral hazard (see Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and their review of the literature). Optimal taxation
is this class of models is the main focus of the recent New Dynamic Public Finance literature, see Kocherlakota (2006) and
Golosov et al., (2007) for overviews. Marcet and Marimon (1992) is an early study that evaluates the importance of both
frictions for economic growth.
1in the tax system changes the use of private contracts. The allocative and welfare consequences of a change
in the tax system then depend on the relative magnitudes of the change in public risk sharing implemented
by the new tax system and the change in risk sharing through private insurance markets.
We evaluate this trade-o in a quantitative example and nd that the crowding-out eect from the
progressive income tax system characterized in this paper can be quantitatively important. In this example
households face income risk of a magnitude estimated from US household data, and are subject to a simple
tax system with a constant marginal tax rate and a constant transfer. To quantify the impact of changes in
the tax code on household labor income and consumption risk we construct and compute three measures of
risk sharing for the income and consumption distributions: Private risk sharing, which is the reduction of
consumption risk below after-tax income risk stemming from private nancial markets; public risk sharing,
which is the reduction in income risk stemming from the progressivity of income taxes and total risk sharing
which is (essentially) the sum of the two. When comparing steady state consumption allocations arising
under dierent tax systems we nd that making taxes more progressive always increases public risk sharing
(by construction) and always reduces private risk sharing; in some case the reduction of private risk sharing
is bigger than the increase in public risk sharing so that increasing the progressivity of the tax code leads to
less total risk sharing among households. We also show that this more than one-for-one crowding out result
never appears in a standard incomplete markets model in the spirit of Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and
Aiyagari (1994) in which explicit risk sharing is limited for reasons exogenous to the model.
It is important to note that our quantitative analysis only focuses on the risk sharing eect of taxes
and therefore abstracts from many elements that are important in the design of optimal taxes such as the
presence of distortions of labor supply and savings decisions or a society's preference for redistribution. Thus
our ndings do not necessarily advocate a particular optimal tax schedule. They simply suggest that, when
studying optimal taxation ignoring the eects that the tax system has on the functioning of private nancial
markets could be a rst order omission.4
The main methodological contribution of this paper is the characterization of the consumption alloca-
tion and distribution of a general equilibrium limited commitment model with a continuum of agents facing
idiosyncratic income risk. This model allows us to analyze insurance mechanisms involving the entire popula-
tion and not only pairwise relationships. We view this as crucial in our analysis of risk sharing arrangements
such as progressive taxation since gains from insurance are particularly sizable among a large pool of agents
with mostly idiosyncratic (i.e. largely uncorrelated) income risk. We demonstrate this by comparing the
consumption allocations in our continuum economy to those arising in a model with only two agents (as
studied by Kocherlakota (1996), Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and Levine (2001), among others) and
show that the allocation of income risk in these two models is qualitatively dierent.5 In addition our model,
4For example in a recent paper Panousi (2009) nds that in an economy with entrepreneurs which are not fully insured
capital taxation, by reducing their risk, can improve welfare. Our results suggests that these ndings will depend crucially on
the reasons why entrepreneurs cannot diversify away their risk.
5In Krueger and Perri (2005, 2006) we use US household data to evaluate the empirical predictions of the limited commitment
model with a continuum of agents for household consumption dynamics and the cross-sectional distribution of consumption.
2in contrast to the previous literature, endogenously delivers a rich cross-sectional consumption distribution
and thus may be of independent interest for the study of other policy reforms where distributional issues are
important. But it is exactly the rich cross-sectional dimension of the model that leads to considerable theo-
retical and computational complications in solving it. To this end we adapt the methodology of Atkeson and
Lucas (1992, 1995) who study ecient allocations in an economy with a continuum of agents and private in-
formation to our environment with limited commitment. We then show, following Kehoe and Levine (1993),
how to decentralize ecient allocations as equilibrium allocations in a standard Arrow Debreu equilibrium
with individual rationality constraints.
In a related paper Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) use a limited commitment model to study the eect
of mandatory public insurance programs against aggregate risk on private insurance arrangements against
idiosyncratic risk. Although their economy is populated by a large number of (potentially heterogeneous)
agents, by assumption agents can only enter pairwise insurance arrangements, not involving any other
member of the population. So their underlying insurance problem is equivalent to the ones studied by
Kocherlakota (1996) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Similar to our result they show that the extent to
which idiosyncratic shocks can be insured depends negatively on the public provision of insurance against
aggregate uncertainty. A similar qualitative result is obtained by Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) in their study
of a model with endogenous private insurance markets which are subject to private information (rather than
limited enforcement) frictions. In a model of informal family insurance Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002)
show that government provided unemployment insurance can crowd out informal insurance provided by the
family more than one for one, a result similar to ours. On the empirical side, Cutler and Gruber (1996) and
Brown et al. (2007) measure the degree to which the public provision of health insurance through Medicaid
crowds out the private provision of insurance and estimate it to be substantial.
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000, 2002) set up a model with a nite, but potentially large number of
agents that can engage in mutual insurance schemes. Once they solve for constrained-ecient insurance
contracts numerically, however, they need to restrict attention to economies with either two agents (as in
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2000), in a model with capital accumulation), or they need to assume that agents
engage in contracts with the rest of the population, treating the rest of the population as one agent (as in
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002)). This again reduces the problem to a bilateral insurance problem as in
the other papers discussed previously.6 Krueger and Uhlig (2006) study a limited commitment model with
a continuum of agents, but focus on endogenizing the value of default through competition. In their paper
the interest rate is treated as exogenous, while it is endogenously determined, jointly with the consumption
distribution in the current paper. As Krueger and Uhlig (2006), the recent work by Broer (2009) contains an
explicit characterization of the stationary consumption distribution under specic assumptions on preferences
and the idiosyncratic income process, as well as a complete existence proof of a stationary equilibrium.
6The authors have to do this to avoid the curse of dimensionality. In their set-up of the problem the cumulative Lagrange
multipliers on the enforcement constraints for each agent become continuous state variables, in practice ruling out computing
allocations for economies with more than a small number of agents. The method of formulating this class of models recursively
using cumulative Lagrange multipliers was pioneered by Marcet and Marimon (1999).
3The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the model environment and dene equilibrium.
In Section 3 we dene and characterize ecient allocations. Section 4 discusses the decentralization. Section
5 presents qualitative features of the equilibrium and compares the qualitative features of the consumption
allocation in the continuum economy with that arising in a simple economy with two agents and perfectly
negatively correlated income shocks. Section 6 provides a quantitative thought experiment of changing the
progressivity of the income tax code, both within our model and a standard incomplete markets Bewley (1986)
model. Section 7 concludes; gures and proofs of the main propositions are contained in the appendix.7
2 The Economy
There is a continuum of consumers of measure 1; who have preferences over consumption streams given by
U(fctg1








The period utility function u : <+ ! D  < is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice
dierentiable and satises the Inada conditions. Its inverse is denoted by C : D ! <+: Hence C(u) is the
amount of the consumption good necessary to yield period utility u: Let  D = sup(D); note that we do not
assume u to be bounded so that  D = 1 is possible.
An individual has stochastic endowment process e 2 E; a nite set with cardinality N, that follows
a Markov process with transition probabilities (e0je): In what follows we use the words endowment and
income synonymously. For each consumer the transition probabilities are assumed to be the same. We
assume a law of large numbers,8 so that the fraction of agents facing shock e0 tomorrow with shock e today
in the population is equal to (e0je): We assume that (e0je) has unique invariant measure (:): Without
loss of generality we normalize average income  e =
P
e e(e) = 1:
We denote by et the current period endowment and by et = (e0;::;et) the history of realizations of
endowment shocks; also (etje0) = (etjet 1)(e1je0). We use the notation esjet to mean that es is a
possible continuation of endowment shock history et: We also assume that at date 0 (and hence at every
date), the cross-sectional measure over current endowment is given by (:); so that the aggregate endowment
is constant over time. At date 0 agents are distinguished by their initial asset holdings, a0 (claims to period
zero consumption) and by their initial shock e0. Let 0 be the joint measure of initial assets and shocks.
The government provides implements income insurance through a tax policy (et) that is constant over
time. Since we want to focus on the public and private allocation of risk in this paper we focus on the case
in which net revenues generated from the tax system are equal to zero.9 We take the tax policy (:) as
7A separate theoretical appendix contains details of some of the more involved technical arguments that are adaptations of
the analysis by Atkeson and Lucas (1995). It is available at http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/research/theoreticalapp.pdf
8Note that we do not require independence of endowment processes across individuals; the assumption of a law of large
numbers can then be justied with Feldman and Gilles (1985), proposition 2.
9Our theoretical analysis fully extends to the case of constant positive government spending that needs to be nanced
4exogenously given (but vary its implied progressivity in our quantitative work). For an individual we let
yt = et(1   (et)) be the after-tax income. Since the function (:) does not depend on time, for a given tax
function (:) there is a one-to-one mapping between pre-tax and after-tax endowments. From now on we
let y 2 Y  <++ denote an individual's generic after-tax endowment, following the Markov process  with
invariant distribution  and denote by yt = (y0;:::yt) a history of after-tax endowment shocks. Taxes (:)
satisfy a period-by-period budget constraint
X
et
et(et)(et) = 0 (2)
With this assumption resource feasibility for this economy states that the sum of all agents' consumption
has to be less or equal than the sum over all individuals' after-tax endowment, which equals 1 in every
period.10 Therefore, (:) is xed and hence the after-tax endowment process is specied, we can carry out
the subsequent analysis without explicit consideration of the government.
Consumers can trade a full set of state-contingent commodities. A consumption allocation c = fct(a0;yt)g
species how much an agent of type (a0;y0) consumes who experienced a history of endowment shocks yt.
Individuals, at any point in time, have the option to renege on existing contracts. The only punishment
for doing so, and hence the only enforcement mechanism for contracts, is that agents that default on their
contracts are banned from future insurance markets. They are, however, allowed to self-insure by saving (but
not borrowing) at an exogenous constant interest rate r.11 The expected continuation utility for an agent








with a0 = 0 given. It is obvious that UAut(yt;r) is strictly increasing in yt, as long as the income shocks are
uncorrelated or positively correlated over time.
Individuals have no incentive to default on a consumption allocation c, at any point in time and any
contingency, if and only if an allocation satises following continuing participation or debt constraints














A  UAut(yt;r) 8yt (4)
through taxes.
10This immediately follows from  e = 1 and equation (2):
11This assumption is motivated by current US bankruptcy laws. Agents ling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 must surrender
all their assets above certain exemption levels; the receipts from selling these assets are used to repay the consumer's debt.
Remaining debt is discharged. In most cases of Chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors have no non-exempt assets (see White (1998)), so
the consequences of ling for bankruptcy only entail restrictions on future credit. Individuals that declared personal bankruptcy
are usually denied credit for seven years from major banks and credit card agencies. We view our assumption of being banned
forever as a rst (and easily tractable) approximation, keeping in mind that it may overstate the punishment from default.
For explicit model of bankruptcy within the context of the standard incomplete markets Bewley (1986) mode see Chatterjee
et al. (2007). The attractive feature of their model and the large literature it has spawned is that default occurs with positive
probability in equilibrium.
5i.e. if the continuation utility from c is at least as big as the continuation utility from defaulting on c; for
all histories yt: Since there is no private information and markets are complete, exclusion will not happen
in equilibrium as nobody would oer a contract to an individual for a contingency at which this individual
would later default with certainty.
Notice that our specication of the debt constraint is more general than the one introduced by Kehoe
and Levine (1993) in which agents who default are not allowed to save. If r =  1; our model is equivalent
to theirs and the right hand side of the debt constraint reduces to











>From now on, whenever there is no danger of ambiguity, we omit the dependence of UAut
t on r:
2.1 Equilibrium
We now dene a competitive equilibrium for the economy described above. We will follow the approach of
Kehoe and Levine (1993). Consider an agent with period zero endowment of y0 and initial wealth of a0:
Wealth is measured as entitlement to the period 0 consumption good. Let 0 be the joint distribution over
(a0;y0) and denote by pt(yt) the date zero price12 of a contract that species delivery of one unit of the
consumption good at period t to/from a person who has experienced endowment shock history yt: For each
contingency ct(a0;yt) yt is the net trade of individual (a0;y0) for that contingency. In period 0 there is no
uncertainty, so normalize the price of the consumption good at period 0 to 1.













Ut(a0;yt;c)  UAut(yt) (8)
Note that, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993), the continuing participation constraints enter the individual
consumption sets directly.
Denition 1 An equilibrium consists of prices fpt(yt)g
1
t=0 and allocations fct(a0;yt)g
1
t=0 such that
 given prices, the allocation solves household's problem for almost all (a0;y0)
12Note that in standard Arrow Debreu equilibrium theory with nitely many consumers, a complete description of the state
of the economy would be everybody's endowment shock history, and all prices would be contingent on this complete state. With
atomistic individuals, the assumed law of large number and no aggregate uncertainty, attention can be restricted to equilibria
in which prices (and quantities) depend only on own personal histories.







As is clear from the equilibrium denition our economy does not include physical capital accumulation or
government debt, so assets are in zero net supply and the aggregate asset to income ratio is identically equal
to zero. While this may seem unrealistic, we deliberately chose to abstract from both types of assets. In a
closed economy with incomplete markets and precautionary savings motives an increase in income uncertainty
leads to higher precautionary saving, hence higher investment, a higher steady state capital stock and thus
higher steady state production (see Aiyagari (1994)). In our economy relaxed borrowing constraints drive
the interest rate up and thus, in a version of the model with capital, the aggregate capital stock down.
Since in this paper we want to focus on the risk sharing properties of dierent taxation schemes rather than
the eects of taxation and income uncertainty on capital accumulation, we compromise on realism to more
clearly isolate the potential importance of the crowding-out mechanism introduced in this paper.
With respect to government debt, the government budget constraint would mandate that, for the same
amount of outstanding government debt, the amount of taxes levied to nance the interest payments on the
debt would vary across steady states, due to changes in the interest rate. Since the comparison of private
households' welfare across economies with dierent tax burdens seems problematic, we also abstract from
government debt in this paper.
3 Ecient Allocations
The next step in our analysis is to characterize and compute equilibrium allocations. Unfortunately this is
hard to do by tackling the equilibrium directly. In particular, the presence of the innite number of dynamic
constraints (8) restricting the choice of state contingent claims does not allow to solve the household's
problem as a standard dynamic programming problem. Therefore in this section we will follow Atkeson and
Lucas (1992, 1995) to rst characterize ecient allocations and then argue in the next section that they can
be decentralized as competitive equilibrium allocations. As shown by Atkeson and Lucas solving for ecient
allocations does reduce to solving a standard dynamic programming problem which makes their approach
so useful for our problem. As they, however, we also have to restrict our analysis to stationary allocations,
i.e. to allocations for which the cross-sectional consumption and wealth distribution is constant over time.
The key insight of Atkeson and Lucas is to analyze the problem of nding ecient allocations in terms
of state contingent utility promises rather than state contingent consumption. Instead of being indexed
by initial assets and endowment shock, now individuals are indexed by initial entitlements to expected
discounted utility at period 0; w0 and initial endowment shocks, y0: We will discuss the connection between
initial asset positions and initial utility promises in Section 4. Let 0 be the period 0 joint measure over
7(w0;y0): An allocation is then a sequence fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 that maps initial entitlements w0 and sequences of
shocks yt into levels of current utility in period t: Here ht(w0;yt) is the current period utility that an agent of
type (w0;y0) receives if she experienced a history of endowment shocks yt: Note that ct(a0;yt) = C(ht(w0;yt))
for an agent whose utility entitlement w0 corresponds to initial asset holdings a0; where C is the inverse of
the period utility function as dened in Section 2. For any allocation h = fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 dene











Equation (10) denes the continuation utility from an allocation h of agent of type (w0;y0) from date t and
shock history yt onwards.
Denition 2 An allocation fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 is constrained feasible with respect to a joint distribution over
utility entitlements and initial endowments, 0; if for almost all (w0;y0) 2supp(0)
w0 = U0(w0;y0;h) (11)











(ytjy0)d0  0: 8t (14)
An allocation fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 is ecient with respect to 0 if it is constrained feasible with respect to 0
and there does not exist another allocation f^ ht(w0;yt)g1









C(ht(w0;yt))(ytjy0)d0 for some t (15)
We call equation (11) the promise keeping constraint: the allocation delivers utility w0 to agents entitled to
w0: Equations (12) are the continuing participation constraints.13 Equation (13) is a boundedness condition
that assures that continuation utility goes to zero in the time limit. Equation (14) is the resource feasibility
condition, requiring aggregate consumption in every period to be less or equal than aggregate endowment in
that period. The denition basically says that a utility allocation is ecient if it attains the utility promises
made by 0 in an individually rational and resource feasible way and there is no other allocation that
does so with less resources. In order to use recursive techniques, however, we have to restrict ourselves to
stationary allocations. Dene t to be the joint measure over endowment shocks yt and continuation utilities
Ut(w0;yt;h) for a given allocation. An allocation is stationary if t = 0 = : In the next subsections we
will show that such an allocation exists, characterize it and demonstrate how to compute it.
13Note that a 0 that puts positive mass on (w0;y0) and satises w0 < UAut(y0) does not permit a constraint feasible
allocation as promise keeping and debt constraints are mutually exclusive. We restrict attention to 0 with the property that
only initial utility entitlements at least as big as the utility from autarky have positive mass.
83.1 Recursive Formulation
In order to solve for stationary ecient allocations we consider the problem of a planner that is responsible
of allocating resources to a given individual and who can trade resources at a xed intertemporal price 1
R:
In this subsection we discuss such a planners' recursive problem and in the next subsection its solution.
We then show that the planners' policy functions induce a Markov process over utility promises and income
shocks which has a unique invariant distribution, and nally we demonstrate that there exists an R at which
the resources needed to deliver utility promises dictated by the stationary distribution equal the aggregate
endowment in the economy.
For constant R 2 (1; 1
]; consider the following functional equation (FE) problem. Individual state
variables are the promise to expected discounted utility that an agent enters the period with, w; and the
current income shock y. The planner chooses how much current period utility to give to the individual, h;
and how much to promise her for the future, gy0; conditional on her next periods endowment realization y0:
We now make the following assumptions on the individual endowment process14
Assumption 1: (y0jy) = (y0) for every y0;y 2 Y
Assumption 2: (y) > 0; for all y 2 Y
The operator TR dening the functional equation of the planner's problem is:

























gy0  UAut(y0) 8y0 2 Y (18)
where V (w) is the resource cost for the planner to provide an individual with expected utility w when the
intertemporal shadow price of resources for the planner is 1
R: The cost consists of the cost for utility delivered
today, (1   1
R)C(h); and expected cost from tomorrow on,
P
y0 (y0)V (gy0); discounted to today. Atkeson
and Lucas (1992, 1995) show that a stationary allocation fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 is ecient if it is induced by an
optimal policy from the functional equation above with R > 1 and satises the resource constraint with
equality.15
Equation (17) is the promise-keeping constraint: an individual that is entitled to w in fact receives utility
w through the allocation rules fh(:);gy0(:)gy02Y : The continuing participation constraints in equation (18)
state that the social planner for each state tomorrow has to guarantee individuals an expected utility promise
14For the quantitative analysis we will relax these assumptions. However, we were unable to prove some of our key theoretical
results without these assumptions.
15A policy (h;fgy0g) induces an allocation, for all (w0;y0); in the following way: h0(w0;y0) = h(w0;y0);w1(w0;y1) =
gy1(w0;y0) and recursively wt(w0;yt) = gyt(wt 1(w0;yt 1);yt) and ht(w0;yt) = h(wt(w0;yt);yt): Adapta-
tions of their proofs to our environment are contained in a separate theoretical appendix, available at
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/research/theoreticalapp.pdf
9at least as high as obtained with the autarkic allocation. The utility in autarky is given as the solution to
the functional equation in (3).
3.2 Existence and Characterization of Policy Functions for Fixed R
We rst prove the existence of optimal allocation rules in the problem with the additional constraints gy0   w
in (18), where  w is an upper bound on future utility promises. We then characterize the solution of this
problem and show that the additional constraints are not binding so that the solution to the problem with
additional constraints is also solution to the original problem.16 The modied Bellman equation is dened on
C(W); that is, the space of continuous and bounded functions on W; where W = fw 2 <jw  w   wg  D
is a compact subset of < and w := miny UAut(y): This gives us a standard bounded dynamic programming
problem. From now on we will denote by TR the operator dened above, but including the additional
constraints.
Note that with the additional constraints on future utility promises, (17) and (18) imply that for every
w in W possible choices h for current utility satisfy
h(w) :=







=:  h(w) (19)
Accordingly dene h := h(w) and  h :=  h(  w): We will show below that we can choose  w = maxy UAut(y)+";
for " > 0 arbitrarily small, without the constraints gy0(w)   w binding at the optimal solution, for all w 2 W.
In order to assure that the constraint set of our dynamic programming problem is compact, for all w 2 W
we need (since D need not be compact)
Assumption 3: [h; h]  D:
Assumption 3 is an assumption purely on the fundamentals (u;;Y;r) of the economy and hence straight-
forward to check. In particular, for r =  1 (the case studied by Kehoe and Levine (1993)) we have
 h(  w) = u(ymax) 2 D and h(w) = u(ymin)   [u(ymax)   Eu(y)] 2 D as long as
ymax
ymin is suciently small
and/or  is suciently small.17
Using standard theory of dynamic programming with bounded returns it is easy to show that the operator
TR has a unique xed point VR 2 C(W) and that for all v0 2 C(W); jjTn
Rv0  VRjj  1
Rnjjv0  VRjj; with the
norm being the sup-norm. Also VR is strictly increasing, strictly convex and continuously dierentiable and
the optimal policies h(w);gy0(w) are continuous, single-valued functions.18
16Note that if we had assumed that u and hence C are bounded functions this complication is avoided as the upper bound
on u serves as upper bound  w: The results to follow do not require boundedness of u.
17For CRRA utility with coecient of relative risk aversion   1 and r =  1 assumption 3 is always satised.
18The proofs of these results are again adaptations of proofs by Atkeson and Lucas (1995).








V 0(gy0) if gy0 > UAut(y0) (20)









First we characterize the behavior of h and gy0 with respect to w: The planner reacts to a higher utility
promise w today by increasing current and expected future utility, i.e. by smoothing the cost over time
and across states. The continuing participation constraints, though, prevent complete cost smoothing across
dierent states: some agents have to be promised more than otherwise optimal in certain states to be
prevented from defaulting in that state. This is exactly the reason why complete risk sharing may not be
constrained feasible.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions 1-3 be satised. The optimal policy h; associated with the minimization problem
in (16) is strictly increasing in w: The optimal policies gy0; are constant in w and equal to UAut(y0) or strictly
increasing in w; for all y0 2 Y: Furthermore
gy0(w) > UAut(y0) and g y0(w) > UAut( y0) imply gy0(w) = g y0(w)
gy0(w) > UAut(y0) and g y0(w) = UAut( y0) imply gy0(w)  g y0(w) and y0 <  y0
Proof. See Appendix
The last part of the lemma states that future promises are equalized across states whenever the continuing
participation constraints permit it. Promises are increased in those states in which the constraints bind.
Now we state a result that is central for the existence of an upper bound  w of utility promises. For
promises that are suciently high it is optimal to deliver most of it in terms of current period utility, and
promise less for the future than the current promises. This puts an upper bound on optimal promises in the
long run, the main result in this section, stated in Theorem 5
Lemma 4 Let assumptions 1-3 be satised. For every (w;y0) 2 W Y; if gy0(w) > UAut(y0); then gy0(w) <
w: Furthermore, for each y0; there exists a unique wy0 such that gy0(wy0) = wy0 = UAut(y0):
Proof. See Appendix
Theorem 5 Let assumptions 1-3 be satised. There exists a  w such that gy0(w) < w for every w   w and
every y0 2 Y:
11Proof. See Appendix
Note that the preceding theorem implies that whenever w 2 [w;  w] = W; then for all y0 2 Y; the constraint
gy0(w)   w is never binding; since the constraint set in the original dynamic programming problem without
the additional constraints is convex, the policy functions characterized in this section are also the optimal
policies for the original problem for all w 2 W: For any (w0;y0) 2 W Y these policies then induce ecient
sequential allocations as described in Section 3.1.
The policy functions gy0 together with the transition matrix  induce a Markov process on W Y: In the
next subsection we will show that this Markov process has a unique invariant measure, the long-run cross
sectional distribution of utility promises (and hence welfare) and income, for any given xed R 2 (1; 1
):
3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of an Invariant Probability Measure
Let B(W) and P(Y ) the set of Borel sets of W and the power set of Y: The function gy0(w); together with
the transition function  for the endowment process, denes a Markov transition function on income shock









if gy0(w) 2 W
else
(22)
Given this transition function, we dene the operator T on the space of probability measures ((W 










for all (W;Y) 2 B(W)  P(Y ): Note that T maps  into itself (see Stokey et. al. (1989), Theorem 8.2).
An invariant probability measure associated with Q is dened to be a xed point of T: We now show that
such a probability measure exists and is unique.
Theorem 6 Let assumptions 1-3 be satised. Then there exists a unique invariant probability measure 
associated with the transition function Q dened above. For all 0 2 ((W  Y );(B(W)  P(Y )); (T0)
n
converges to  in total variation norm.
Proof. See Appendix
Note that Lemma 4 and Theorem 5 above imply that any ergodic set of the Markov process associated
with Q must lie within [UAut(ymin);UAut(ymax)]Y and that the support of the unique invariant probability
measure is a subset of this set.
So far we proved that, for a xed intertemporal price R; policy functions (h;gy0), cost functions V and
invariant probability measures  exist and are unique. From now on we will index (h;gy0);V and  by R to
make clear that these functions and measures were derived for a xed R: In the next section we will discuss
12how to nd the intertemporal price R associated with an ecient stationary allocation. Remember from
Subsection A that this requires the allocation to satisfy the aggregate resource constraint with equality, a
constraint that we have not yet imposed and will do so in the next subsection in order to solve for R.
3.4 Determination of the \Market Clearing" R
In this section we will analyze how the resource requirements imposed by the cross-sectional distribution
of utility promises R vary with R: We will provide conditions under which an R exists for which these
resource requirements exactly equal the aggregate endowment in the economy.
In the previous section we showed that for a xed R 2 (1; 1
) there exists a unique stationary joint











In this section we discuss the qualitative features of the function d(:): Since by assumption  y :=
R
ydR
does not vary with R; the behavior of d depends on how VR and R vary with R: The behavior of R with
respect to R in turn depends on the behavior of gR
y0 with respect to R as gR
y0 determines the Markov process
to which R is the invariant probability measure. Following Atkeson and Lucas (1995) we can show that
d(R) is continuous and increasing on (1; 1
):19
Thus, if one can show that
lim
R&1




d(R) > 0 (26)
then the existence of a resource-clearing R follows.20
3.4.1 The Case R = 1

In this subsection we characterize optimal policies of the planner for R = 1
 and provide a sucient condition






w if w  UAut(y0)
UAut(y0) if w < UAut(y0)
(27)
19Again the arguments are adaptations of Atkeson and Lucas' (1995). For continuity of d(R) one shows that VR is uniformly
continuous in R and that gR
y0 is continuous as a function of R so that R is continuous in R (in the sense of weak convergence).
For monotonicity of d(R) the key results are that gR
y0 is increasing in R so that R(:;y) is increasing in R (in the sense of
stochastic dominance), which, together with the fact that VR is increasing in w proves that d(R) is an increasing function.
20Also note that, given our previous theoretical results, it is straightforward to search for R numerically: x an R0; solve
the planners' dynamic programming problem (which we proved to have a unique solution), determine the induced invariant
measure over promises (whose existence and uniqueness we proved), and compute d(R0). If d(R0) > 0; reduce the guess for R;
otherwise increase it. We have included details of our computational algorithm in the separate theoretical appendix.
13from the rst order conditions of the recursive planners' problem (which still has a unique solution as all
the results of Section 3.2 go through). Now there is a continuum of invariant measures associated with the







for all w < UAut(ymax) as the probability of leaving such a w is at least (ymax) and the
probability of coming back (into a small enough neighborhood) is 0: Therefore all w in the support of any
possible invariant measure satisfy gy0(w) = w. From the promise-keeping constraint h(w) = w follows, and
each individuals' consumption is constant over time: for R = 1
 there is complete risk sharing.
For complete risk sharing to be ecient it has to satisfy the resource constraint. Since the cost function






(y) if w = UAut(ymax)
0 if w 6= UAut(ymax)
(28)
All individuals receive utility promises w = UAut(ymax) and hence the same current utility h(UAut(ymax)) =
UAut(ymax): This allocation has per-period resource cost C(UAut(ymax)) and is resource feasible if and only
if C(UAut(ymax))   y; or applying the strictly increasing period utility function u to both sides, if and only






= C(UAut(ymax))    y (29)
We summarize the discussion in the following
Lemma 7 Let assumptions 1-3 be satised. For R = 1
 any solution to the recursive social planners' problem
exhibits complete risk sharing. There exists an ecient stationary allocation with complete risk sharing if
and only if UAut(ymax)  u( y):
Intuitively, the lemma states that it is constrained ecient to share resources equally among the pop-
ulation in this economy if the agents with the highest incentive to renege on this sharing rule, namely the
agents with currently high income, nd it in their interest to accept constant consumption at c =  y and
lifetime utility u( y); rather than to leave and obtain lifetime utility UAut(ymax):
Using arguments similar to showing continuity of d(R) on (1; 1
) one can show that limR% 1











is dened as in (29): In order to rule out complete risk sharing21 we now make
Assumption 4: UAut(ymax) > u( y)
Note that this assumption is satised if the time discount factor  is suciently small, agents are not
too risk-averse or the largest endowment shock is suciently large. We obtain
21If there is complete risk sharing under a particular tax system (remember that the tax system maps a given pre-tax income
process into a particular after-tax income process), then a small tax reform has no eect on the extent of risk sharing since the
resulting allocation is the complete risk sharing allocation: our crowding-out eect is absent.
14Lemma 8 Let assumptions 1-4 be satised. Then limR% 1
 d(R) > 0.










   y > 0
3.4.2 The Case of R Approaching 1
In this subsection we provide necessary and sucient conditions for autarky (all agents consume their
endowment in each period) to be an ecient allocation and characterize policies for R approaching 1 from
above.
If agents are very impatient and/or the risk of future low endowments is low, then it is not ecient for
the planner to persuade currently rich agents to give up resources today in exchange for insurance tomorrow.
For r =  1 (no saving after default, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) )this result can be stated and proved
formally in the next





Proof. For the if-part we note that the autarkic allocation satises the rst order conditions for some
R > 1 if (30) holds. Since autarky is constrained feasible, it is ecient.22 The only-if part is proved in the
appendix.
The previous lemma provides a condition under which d(R) = 0 as R approaches 1; with autarky as the






With assumption 5, as R approaches 1; the resulting allocation features some, but (as long as assumption
4 holds) not complete risk sharing. We state the following conjecture, which we were able to prove for CRRA
utility, r =  1 and Y = fyl;yhg but not for the general case considered here.24
Conjecture 10 Let assumptions 1-5 be satised. Then there exists R > 1 such that d(R) < 0:
22This is in fact true for arbitrary r   1.
23If the ecient allocation is autarkic a small change in the tax system changes the allocation on a one to one basis with
after tax incomes. No private insurance is crowded out since no private insurance takes place.
24Given our other theoretical results, we can check whether d(R) < 0 for R suciently close to 1 numerically. In all our
quantitative experiments this was the case.
15We then can conclude our theoretical analysis of stationary ecient allocations with the following theo-
rem, whose proof follows directly from the previous lemmas and conjecture.25
Theorem 11 Let assumptions 1-5 be satised. There exists R 2 (1; 1





y0 ) is ecient and has some, but not complete risk sharing.
As indicated above, some of our results and proof strategies resemble Atkeson and Lucas (1995). The
basic strategy to prove existence of a stationary general equilibrium (as we will show in the next section
stationary ecient allocations induce stationary equilibrium allocations) also exhibits similarities to existence
proofs for standard incomplete markets models as in Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994).26
The main dierence is that the authors, due to the simple asset structure in their models, can tackle the
equilibrium directly. As we do, they rst, for a xed and constant interest rate, solve a simple dynamic
programming problem27 (they for the single household, with assets as state variable, we for the planners,
with utility promises as state variables). Then they let the optimal policies induce a Markov process to which
a unique invariant distribution is shown to exist.28 Finally the market clearing interest rate is determined
from the goods or asset market clearing condition.29 These similarities in the theoretical analysis also suggest
similar computational algorithms when solving both models numerically.
4 Decentralization
In this section we describe how we decentralize a stationary ecient allocation h = fht(w0;yt)g1
t=0 induced by
the optimal policies from the recursive planners' problem as a competitive equilibrium as dened in Section
3. Let 
t(ytjy0)(a0;yt)  0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the continuing participation
constraint at history yt and P(yt) = fyj(ytjy) > 0g be the set of all endowment shock histories that
can have yt as its continuation. Using the rst order necessary conditions of the household's maximization

















25No claim of uniqueness can be made. In all our numerical exercises d(R) was strictly increasing, however, yielding a unique
R and associated unique stationary ecient allocation.
26We will contrast the quantitative ndings from our model with the Bewley (1986) and Huggett (1993) version of the
standard exogenous incomplete markets model in the quantitative secition of the paper.
27As in our model, boundedness of the state space for assets from above has to be assured. Huggett (1993) assumes that
income can only take two values, but doesn't need the stochastic process to be iid over time nor any assumption on the period
utility function. Aiyagari assumes iid income and u to be bounded and to have bounded relative risk aversion -see his working
paper. We do not require any boundedness assumption on u; but need the iid assumption.
28The theorems invoked for the existence of a unique invariant measure are similar in spirit; in particular they all require a
\mixing condition" that assures that there is a unique ergodic set. In their setting agents with bad income shocks run down
their assets, and good income shocks induce upward jumps in the asset position; in our setting agents with bad shocks move
down in the entitlement distribution towards UAut(ymin); with good shocks inducing jumps towards higher w; due to binding
participation constraints.
29Huggett (1993) provides no theoretical properties of the excess asset demand function, in Aiyagari (1994) the presence
of physical capital, which makes the supply of assets interest-elastic, assures (together with continuity of the asset demand
function) the existence of a market-clearing interest rate.
16Obviously, an agent whose participation constraint does not bind at contingency yt+1, following history yt;
faces the standard complete markets Euler equation (as (a0;yt+1) = 0).
Now consider the ecient allocation of utilities fht(w0;yt)g as found in the previous section. Combining
the rst order condition and the envelope condition from the planners problem we have for an agent that is










This suggests that the equilibrium prices satisfy (with normalization of p0 = 1)
pt(yt) =
(ytjy0)
Rt = pt(ytjy0): (34)
with pt = R t: That is, the price for a commodity delivered contingent on personal histories is composed of
two components, an aggregate intertemporal price pt = R t and an individual specic, history dependent
component, equal to the probability that the personal history occurs.
Given prices, the initial wealth level that makes the ecient consumption allocation aordable for an
agent of type (w0;y0) is given by










= a0(w0;y0) < 1 (35)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the ecient consumption allocation is bounded from









The preceding discussion can be summarized in the following
Theorem 12 Suppose that fht(w0;yt)g
1
t=0 is a stationary ecient allocation (with associated shadow in-
terest rate R > 1
). Then prices fpt(yt)g and allocations fct(a0;yt)g; as dened in (34) and (36) are an
equilibrium for initial wealth distribution 0 derived from 0 and (35).
Proof. See Appendix
So far we have shown the existence of a stationary equilibrium of our economy and characterized some
of its properties. In the next section we illustrate some of its qualitative features.




31Therefore, to decentralize a particular stationary ecient consumption allocation we require a very particular initial distri-
bution over initial assets. In this sense one of the primitives of our model, 0; can't be chosen arbitrarily, which is true in all
steady state analyses.
32Given that the optimal recursive policy function h(:;y) is a strictly increasing function in w, the ht(:;yt) and hence the
ct(:;yt) are strictly increasing in w0: Therefore a0(:;y0) is strictly increasing and thus invertible. We denote its inverse by a 1
0 :
175 Qualitative Features of the Ecient Allocation
In this section we illustrate some of the qualitative features of the ecient allocation characterized in the
section above. To do so we consider a simple numerical example of our economy in which the after-tax
income process is iid can take only two values, 0  yl < yh  2, which are equally likely. Note that since
the average after-tax endowments are normalized to 1 we have yl = 2   yh:
In order to highlight the qualitative dierences of ecient allocations in our model with a continuum
of agents and in the model with a small number of agents (the case typically studied in the literature) we
also present results for a limited commitment model with two agents i = 1;2, each of which has endowment
yi 2 fyl;yhg: We assume that in the two agent economy incomes are perfectly negatively correlated33, so
that if agent 1 has income yl; agent 2 has income yh and vice versa.34 Consequently, as in the continuum
economy, average income in the economy is nonstochastic and equal to 1. In accordance with the continuum
economy we also assume that the income process in the two-agent economy is iid over time, with equal
probability of each agent being rich in every period.
For both economies we assume that the outside option is characterized by r =  1; that is, no saving
in autarky is permitted. Then it is straightforward to compute that for both economies the utilities from























We note that the size of yh is a measure of income risk, with higher yh associated with more income risk. It
is straightforward to show that UAut(yl) is strictly declining in yh; whereas UAut(yh) is strictly increasing
in yh at yh = 1; and strictly concave with unique maximum y












We now want to characterize and compare symmetric (across agents) constrained ecient stationary con-
sumption distributions across the two models. We are particularly interested in the potential qualitative and
quantitative dierences of comparative statics results with respect to changes in after-tax income dispersion
yh, that is, changes of the progressivity of the tax code.
To put this example into the context of the tax system we will use in our quantitative examples, suppose
that pre-tax endowment can take two values el < eh with equal probability and recall we have assumed that
mean income equals 1: The tax system is characterized by a constant marginal tax rate  and a constant
33Similar, although less clean results can be derived for the two-agent economy where shocks are not perfectly negatively
correlated, in which case aggregate (average) income is stochastic.
34This is exactly the model studied by Kehoe and Levine (2001) and Krueger and Perri (2006). Kehoe and Levine (1993),
Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001) all analyze limited commitment models with a nite and typically small number of agents.
18transfer d so that
yl = (1   )el + d
yh = (1   )eh + d
Budget balance of the government implies that  = d and so the after-tax incomes are given by
yl = (1   )el +  = el + (1   el)
yh = (1   )eh +  = eh   (eh   1)











Thus as long as  > 0 the tax system is progressive (t0(e) > 0) and the progressivity of the tax system
increases with  (since
dt
0(e)
 > 0) and yh decreases with : Thus a reduction in yh is equivalent to a more
progressive tax system, holding the pre-tax endowment process constant. Thus all comparative statics results
with respect to yh to follow can be interpreted as a change in the progressivity of the tax code; with more
progressivity representing a lower value of yh:
5.1 Three Risk Sharing Regimes
In both economies ecient consumption allocations are either characterized by autarky (everybody consumes
its after-tax income in all states), perfect risk sharing (everybody consumes average income of 1 in all states)
or partial, but not perfect risk sharing. Keeping xed preferences (u;); one can dene, for both models,









where j = 2 stands for the two agent economic and j = c for the continuum economy. If yh 2 [1;yaut
j ];
the constraint ecient consumption allocation is autarkic, if yh 2 [y
f
j ;2]; it is characterized by perfect risk
sharing, and if yh 2 (yaut
2 ;y
f
2) it is characterized by partial risk sharing.
5.1.1 Full Risk Sharing
Perfect risk sharing entails consuming average income  y = 1 for all agents, in each state. For this allocation












in both economies j = 2;c:
The two critical values y
f
2 = yf
c > 1 satisfy the above equations with equality, unless even at yh = 2; the
equations hold with strict inequality. Perfect risk sharing occurs for exactly the same set of yh values (and
thus the same range of tax progressivity) in the continuum economy and the two-agent economy. As long
as there is perfect risk sharing, a marginal change in tax progressivity yh has no eect on the consumption
allocation in either economy: in both economies there is exactly a one-for-one crowding out of private risk
sharing from public risk sharing.
5.1.2 Autarky
Autarky may be the only feasible allocation, and thus the (constrained-) ecient allocation. For the contin-
uum economy autarky is ecient if and only if (see Lemma 5)
u0(yh)  u0(2   yh)





Thus we conclude that yaut
c ;yaut
2 2 (1;2) and that yaut
c < yaut
2 :Thus the set of values of income (risk) yh for
which the constrained ecient allocation is autarkic is strictly bigger in the two agent economy than in the
continuum economy. In this sense, there is more risk sharing possible in a continuum economy than in the
two-agent economy.35
In this region of the parameter space, a small change in yh (equivalently in the progressivity of tax system)
changes the consumption distribution one-for one with the income distribution. There is no crowding-out
eect induced by a change in the tax system. Again, the absence of a crowding out eect occurs for a wider
set of parameter values (tax rates) in the two agent economy, relative to the continuum economy.
5.1.3 Partial Risk Sharing
For all yh 2 (yaut
c ;yf
c) (respectively, for all yh 2 (yaut
2 ;y
f
2) in the two agent economy) the stationary con-
strained ecient consumption distribution is characterized by partial risk sharing. In the next subsection we
will characterize this distribution further in both economies, with particular focus on how it changes with
the measure of inequality yh;and thus with the degree of tax progressivity.
35Note that yaut
2 = y
2 (the level of yh that maximizes the value of autarky for the currently rich household).
20Consumption Dynamics with Partial Risk Sharing in the Two Agent Economy: Characteriza-
tion and Comparative Statics In Krueger and Perri (2006), building on results by Kehoe and Levine




characterized by ch; the consumption level of households with currently high income.36 This number is the
















an increase in yh reduces the value of UAut(yh) and reduces ch and increases cl = 2 ch: That is, consumption
dispersion declines with an increase in yh:Put dierently, if there is partial insurance to start with, then
an increase in public risk sharing through the tax system (a reduction of yh) unambiguously increases
consumption risk; public insurance crowds out private insurance more than one-for-one.
Consumption Dynamics with Partial Risk Sharing in the Continuum Economy: Characteriza-
tion and Comparative Statics For the continuum economy, under partial risk sharing (that is, for all
yh 2 (yaut
c ;yf
c)), the consumption dynamics and distribution is more complex. Lemma 1 and 2 show that
the optimal policy function gy0(w); as a function of utility promises w; is constant and equal to the value of
autarky UAut(y0); intersects the 450 line and at some point w > UAut(y0) starts to monotonically increase.
If gyl(w) > UAut(yl) and gyh(w) > UAut(yh); then gyl(w) = gyh(w): Figure 1 plots a typical policy function
for utility promises tomorrow, gy0(w); against utility promises today, w; conditional on tomorrow's shock
being either y0 = yl or y0 = yh:
Figure 1 can be used to deduce the dynamics of utility promises w (and hence consumption, which is
a strictly monotone function of w); as well as the invariant distribution over utility promises and hence
consumption. First, the support of the stationary distribution of utility w is equal to [UAut(yl);UAut(yh)];
as shown in the theoretical analysis. For all w 2 [UAut(yl);UAut(yh)] an agent with high income y0 = yh
receives continuation utility w0 = UAut(yh): History is forgotten in this event, as with y0 = yh future
utility does not depend on present utility entitlements w; which summarize the history of past endowment
shocks. For agents with y0 = yl history does matter. An agent starting with w = w3 = UAut(yh) that
receives y0 = yl drops to w2 = gy0(UAut(yh)) < UAut(yh); and, upon a further bad shocks, works herself
downwards through the entitlement distribution. In a nite number of steps (in the gure this number of
steps is 2) an agent with a string of bad shocks arrives at w1 = UAut(yl); with any good shock putting her
immediately back to w3 = UAut(yh): Consumption obeys the same dynamics as utility entitlements since
it is is a strictly monotonic function of utility entitlements. The stationary utility entitlement (and thus
consumption) distribution associated with the policy functions is depicted in gure 2.
36Currently poor households consume cl = 2   ch: The ecient consumption allocation in the two agent model is history-
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Figure 2: Invariant Consumption Distribution 
22The ecient stationary consumption distribution is formally characterized as follows:37
Proposition 13 For a given interest rate R the constrained ecient stationary consumption allocation is
characterized by a number n > 2; and ordered consumption levels c1;c2;:::cn,ordered lifetime utility levels
w1;w2;:::;wn and associated probabilities 1;2;:::;n such that:
1. The stationary consumption and utility distribution is given by
1 = 0:5n 1
j = 0:5n j+1 for j = 2;:::;n
2. The consumption and utility levels satisfy
w1 = UAut(yl)
wn = UAut(yh)




for j = 1;:::;n (38)
and
u0(cj) = Ru0(cj 1) for j = 3;:::;n (39)
u0(c2)  Ru0(c1) (40)
3. The interest rate itself if determined from the resource constraint
n X
j=1
jcj = 1 (41)
For a given n; equations (38);(39) and (41) form a system of 2n + 1 equations in the unknowns
c1;c2;:::cn;w1;w2;:::;wn;R: If for a given n; equation (40) is satised an there in no larger n such that
this is true, we have found the optimal step size.38 While it seems impossible to fully analytically derive the
n consumption levels and provide comparative statics with respect to income dispersion yh, the following
result immediately follows from the previous proposition.
Corollary 14 In the continuum economy we have (from the rst and third equation of (38)) that c1 = yl
and cn < yh:
37Krueger and Uhlig (2006) prove a similar result, in a model with exogenous interest rates where the consequence of default is
not nancial autarky, but the best insurance contract a competing nancial intermediary oers. The proof of the characterization
of the ecient consumption and lifetime utility allocation in this paper is identical to the one in Krueger and Uhlig (2006) and
hence omitted.
38This simple algorithm is only applicable in the iid case with two shocks, however. For a more general endowment process
the computational method based on the theory developed above and described in detail in the appendix needs to be used to
compute stationary constrained-ecient allocations.
23In summary, in the case of partial risk sharing the continuum economy insures households against bad
income shock by allowing consumption decline slowly over time, relative to the two agent economy. This
comes at the cost that consumption eventually falls to a lower level than in the two agent economy, albeit
only in the unlikely event of a sequence of bad income shocks. Also, the allocation in the continuum economy
features history dependence in that it depends on the length of the sequence of bad shocks, whereas in the
two-agent economy the consumption allocation in this example only depends on the current shock.
Since changes in income dispersion yh induce changes in the interest rate R it is hard to derive further
clear-cut comparative statics results. Note, however, that the previous corollary immediately implies that, in
stark contrast to the two-agent economy, an increase in yh and thus a decrease in yl reduces the lower end of
the support of the consumption distribution. Thus an increase in in tax progressivity, while leading to more
consumption dispersion and lower minimum consumption in the two-agent model, leads to an increase of
minimum consumption in the continuum model. These results demonstrate that the version of the limited
commitment model with only two (classes of) households has qualitatively dierent implications for the
ecient distribution of consumption and the impact on this distribution of a change in the progressivity
of the tax code than the continuum model with its richer (and arguably more realistic) consumption and
wealth distribution
In the remainder of the paper we now want to document that the quantitative importance of the crowding-
out eect of private through public insurance is potentially large in a realistically parameterized version of
the continuum economy.
6 A Quantitative Example
In this section it is our goal to study the quantitative impact of changes in the progressivity of the tax system
on the amount of risk sharing in equilibrium. In particular we use the model to measure the extent to which
public risk sharing mechanisms (i.e. progressive taxes) and private risk sharing mechanisms (i.e. nancial
markets) interact in insulating private consumption from random income uctuations. In order to do so we
specify and estimate a simple statistical process for pre-tax labor income risk on US household data, and
then study, for a given set of preference parameters, how a change in the tax system aects risk sharing and
steady state consumption allocations.
We would like to stress that we restrict attention to the long-run consequences of dierent tax codes
on private nancial markets and overall risk sharing, rather than characterizing the entire transition path
induced by a tax reform. Therefore, while in our simple model long-run eects of changes in the tax code
on risk sharing map one-for-one into ex-ante welfare of households, we do not emphasize the normative
implications of the model (nor do we propose to use our model to study optimal policy, as optimal tax policy
is likely to depend on a variety of factors omitted here, including the explicit consideration of transitional
dynamics).39
39Using our methodology to study transitions is not immediate. An unexpected change in government policies alters the
246.1 Functional Forms and Parameterization
We now describe the estimation of the pre-tax labor income process, the class of tax functions we consider
in our experiments and the parameterization of preferences and the consequences of default.
6.1.1 Labor Income Risk
We specify the process for log pre-tax labor income of household i as a simple AR(1) process
logeit = logeit 1 + "it (42)
This process is meant to capture idiosyncratic labor income shocks (risk) of US households, and is fully
characterized by the two parameters  and ". In order to separately identify the two parameters in (42) we
use micro data with a panel dimension provided the US Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We select
the set all households in the CEX over the period 2000-2007, whose head is between the age of 25 and
60 and which have positive labor income for two consecutive periods.40 Consistently with the model we
measure income as real labor earnings before taxes from all members of the household. Since in the model
all households have the same size we divide real total labor income by the number of adult equivalents
in the household. Then in order to exclude from our data permanent dierences across households and
aggregate risk41 the income measures are regressed each year on a set of individual controls (which include
quarter and education dummies, a quartic in age and age-education interactions). The residuals from those
regressions are the data equivalent of logeit in the process (42) . Since for each household we have exactly
two observations we can estimate time varying parameters t and "t for each period using the following





"t = var(logeit)   tvar(logeit 1)
and nally obtain estimates of  and " as the simple time averages of t and "t from the rst quarter of
2000 to the rst quarter of 2007. We estimate  = 0:8014 (with a standard error of 0:03) and 2
" = 0:1849
(with a standard error of 0:021): These estimates reveal that labor income risk quite persistent, but also
contains a sizeable transitory component (possibly due to measurement error). These two general ndings
set of feasible distributions of lifetime expected discounted utilities this economy can attain with given aggregate resources
(which remain unchanged). Thus, for a particular agent the promised utility w she entered the period with is not necessarily
a valid description of her state after the change in scal policy (a probability zero event) anymore. Consequently a method
that employs promised expected utility as a state variable cannot be employed to compute transitional dynamics induced by
unexpected policy innovations. Any transition analysis in this economy has to tackle the (sequential) competitive equilibrium
directly, as we do in Krueger and Perri (2006).
40A signicant fraction of households in the CEX sample report their labor income in the past year at two consecutive points
in time, on average 10 month apart. We use CEX as opposed to PSID as CEX has a larger sample size (although the panel
dimension is much smaller). We conjecture that similar estimates would be obtained from PSID data since Heathcote et al.
(2009) document that the CEX and the PSID income data align rather well along a number of cross-sectional dimensions.
41These are not explicitly modeled in our theoretical analysis that focuses on idiosyncratic risk.
25are consistent with a number of studies (see for example MaCurdy, 1982) that estimate statistical processes
for household earnings or income.
In order to map the estimated process into our theory in which pre-tax labor income follows a nite state
Markov chain we discretize the continuous AR(1) process into a nite state Markov chain with 5 states using
the Tauchen procedure. Finally we re-normalize the value of all income states (after translating these states
from logs into levels) such that mean pre-tax labor income equals to 1:
6.1.2 Fiscal Policy
Since the purpose of our quantitative exercise is to document the potential quantitative importance of the
crowding-out mechanism, rather than to argue that the crowding-out eect is larger than one in the actual
US economy we restrict ourselves to the same simple one-parameter family of tax functions as in section
5 for which the degree of public risk sharing can be varied in a transparent way. Therefore, as above we
assume that the tax code is given by a constant marginal tax rate  and a xed deduction (or transfer) d;
so that the tax code is given by
(e) = e   d:
Recall that, given our normalization of average pre-tax income in the economy to  e = 1; the government
budget constraint implies d = ; and after-tax income y is given by
y = e   (e) = (1   )e + :
The policy parameter  2 (  emin
1 emin;1] here measures the constant marginal tax rate but also, given a balanced
budget, the size of lump sum transfers to households. Since marginal taxes are proportional and transfers are
lump sum, the higher is  the larger is the degree of redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky households,
i.e. the extent of public risk sharing. Notice that as  approaches  emin
1 emin from above, the tax system actually
magnies income risk faced by households. At the other extreme when  = 1 the government tax and transfer
system eliminates income risk faced by households altogether: after-tax income y is constant and equal to 1
regardless of a household's pre-tax income realization e.
6.1.3 Preferences and Consequences of Default
We assume that households have log-utility, u(c) = log(c); are not permitted to save after default, r =  1
and document results for various combinations of time discount factors  2 (0;1). The essential trade-o
determining the extent of private risk sharing in equilibrium involves a comparison between the value of
staying in the risk sharing agreement, relative to the value of being excluded from nancial markets. The
impact on both of these values of varying risk aversion  and saving returns r after default are qualitatively
similar to the impact of varying : A higher  as well as a higher risk aversion  and a reduction in r
(which makes consumption smoothing in autarky harder) increases the value of having access to risk sharing











































































Figure 3: The eects of public risk sharing
arrangements, relative to autarky, and hence relaxes the debt constraints, resulting in increase in private
risk sharing.
6.2 Three Measures of Risk Sharing
Before we present our numerical results we dene dierent measures of risk sharing which we will use to
quantify the change in after-tax income and consumption risk faced by households induced by changes in
the tax code. We dene Total Intermediation (TI) of risk as one minus the ratio between the standard
deviations of consumption to the standard deviation of pre-tax income:




Note that when std(c) = 0; TI = 1, consumption does not vary at all across individuals and the economy
exhibits complete risk sharing. If std(c) = std(e), TI = 0 and consumption varies one for one with pre-tax
endowments For 0 < TI < 1 there is some, but not complete risk sharing, with higher TI indicating higher
risk sharing.
We can decompose TI into two components reecting risk intermediation enforced by the government
(GI) via the tax system and risk intermediation achieved in addition by private insurance contracts, (PI):
Similar to TI we dene as
GI = 1  
std(y)
std(e)




Note that given our tax function it follows that std(y) = (1   )std(e) so that government intermediation
27equals GI =  and thus GI measures nothing else but the progressivity of the tax code.
To interpret PI note that if std(c) = 0; PI = 0 and there is complete risk sharing achieved through
private markets. If, on the other hand std(c) = std(y); PI = 0 and private markets do not achieve any risk
sharing over and above that implemented by the tax system. A simple calculation shows that
TI = GI + (1   GI)  PI (44)
Hence total intermediation of risk equals government intermediation of risk plus private intermediation of
that part of risk that is not already removed by the tax system. In particular, under our tax system when
 = 0 it implies that GI = 0 and hence TI = PI:
6.3 Quantitative Results: Limited Commitment Model
Figure 3 plots the measures TI and PI (panel a) as well as the interest rate (panel b), as a function of ; for
 = 0:9: Panels (a) and (b) show that both total intermediation TI and the real interest rate are U-shaped
functions of government intermediation . When  is suciently close to  emin
1 emin (which in our example is
around -0:32) the tax system is regressive enough to bring the value of after-tax income in the lowest state
close to 0 so that the value of autarky approaches  1, and the rst best, full risk sharing allocation is
enforceable. In this case total intermediation (and private intermediation as is clear from equation (44)) are
exactly 100% and the gross real interest rate is equal to 1=: On the other end of the spectrum, if  = 1
full insurance is achieved through government intermediation alone: total intermediation is again 100% and
the interest rate is 1=. In the middle range of government intermediation  perfect risk sharing is not
achievable, total intermediation is less than 100 and the corresponding interest rate falls below its complete
markets level of 1=: The fact that the rst best allocation can be achieved with extremely regressive or
extremely progressive taxes is a strong prediction of this model, but not one that we think is very relevant for
the design of optimal policy, as obviously in real economies there are many factors which we abstract from
in our setup (e.g. disincentive eects on labor supply, equity considerations) that will make such extreme
policies undesirable. The more relevant conclusion from our model is that government tax policy, regardless
of what motivates it, has a potential eect on the incentives that sustain of private risk sharing.
To evaluate the magnitude of this impact in an empirically plausible range of scal policy, gure 4 below
reports private risk sharing and total risk sharing (panel a) and interest rates (panel b) for values of 
ranging from 0 (a at tax) to 40% (which approximates the degree of public redistribution observed in some
European countries) in three economies, characterized by  = 0:95;0:9;0:8: The values for s are chosen to
show three possible patterns of interaction between public and private risk sharing we discuss now.
First, let us focus on the dashed lines that represent private intermediation (PI) as a function of public
intermediation : Note that all three lines are decreasing. Private intermediation declines with  because
of two eects. The rst is rather mechanical: public risk sharing simply displaces private intermediation


















































































Figure 4: The eects of public risk sharing in three economies
since a reduction of income risk through progressive taxation diminishes the need for private markets to
supply insurance. This \displacement" eect is at work in any model with a complete set of assets in which
private and public risk sharing are perfect substitutes, in the sense that both channels can provide insurance
costlessly and state-contingently. However, the displacement eect can at most explain a 100% crowding-out
of private insurance by public insurance. The second eect is specic to the limited commitment model
studied in this paper, and it stems from the fact that public intermediation, by reducing income risk of
households, increases the value of being excluded from nancial markets and hence tightens the enforcement
constraints. This \tightening" eect together with the displacement eect can generate an overall crowding-
out eect that is larger than a 100%, that is, it can imply that when the government increases public
intermediation by raising the progressivity of the income tax code total intermediation falls. Observe from
gure 4 that exactly this happens when the discount factor takes a value of  = 0:95, the top solid line in
panel (a). When  = 0:9 total intermediation is essentially at (it is in fact very mildly U-shaped) and when
 = 0:8 the crowding-out eect is always less than 100%, i.e. when public intermediation increases so does
total intermediation.
Why does the magnitude of the crowding-out eect crucially depend on the time discount factor? Dierent
's eectively measure the eectiveness of private intermediation: the higher the ; the more households value
future consumption insurance through private markets, and therefore the easier it is to enforce contracts.
This implies that in high  economies private households make large use of private intermediation and hence
there is the potential for a large displacement eect. This, together with the tightening eect can lead to
more than 100% crowding out. When  is low nancial markets are less eective in providing insurance (the
enforcement constraints are tighter), there is less potential for a large displacement eect and a crowding-out
29eect in excess of 100% is less likely to materialize. At the extreme, consider the limiting case in which  is
so low that the economy is in autarky (and remains there after a change in tax policy). In this case public
risk sharing has no \displacement" nor \tightening" eect, and any given increase in public risk sharing
causes an equal increase in total intermediation. Finally notice (panel b) that in the range of  we display
in gure 4 interest rates are always a declining function of public intermediation. This provides further
direct evidence of the tightening eect induced by higher public risk sharing. Since lower income risk (due to
higher ) tightens borrowing constraints (by raising the value of autarky) it reduces the aggregate demand
for credit, thus lowering the required equilibrium interest rate.
6.4 Quantitative Results: Standard Incomplete Markets Model
In this section we contrast our ndings on the eects of changes in public risk sharing (government inter-
mediation) in a limited commitment economy to the eects of the same changes in a standard incomplete
markets model. In this economy agents are only permitted to trade a single uncontingent bond and they
face an exogenously specied constant borrowing limit b.42 By assumption enforcement frictions are absent
in this model. The specic model we consider is most similar to the one studied by Huggett (1993) and
shares the same market structure and the same continuum of households with the models of Bewley (1986)
and Aiyagari (1994). The household problem in recursive formulation reads as
v(a;y) = max
 ba0y+Ra





where a are holdings of the one-period bond at the beginning of the period and R is the gross real interest rate
on these bonds. As with the previous model we compare stationary equilibria under dierent tax systems.
To enable an exact comparison with the limited commitment economy we also use the same preferences and
multiple discount factors, while we set the maximum amount that can be borrowed by households to an
amount equivalent to ve times average income.43 Figure 5 reports how total and private intermediation
(panel a) and interest rates (panel b) respond to changes in government intermediation in the standard
incomplete markets economy.
First note that, similar to the previous model, as government intermediation increases private intermedi-
ation (the dashed lines in gure 5) falls, suggesting the presence of a crowding-out eect under this market
structure as well. The intuition behind this crowding-out eect is quite dierent here, though. When larger
government intermediation reduces income risk of households, it also reduces the incentive of consumers of
engaging in precautionary saving. With a weaker precautionary motive households behave more like \Perma-
nent Income" consumers, which leads to a more dispersed long-run wealth distribution as  increases.44 Such
42Since average income is normalized to  y = 1; b has the interpretation of the fraction of average income that a household
can borrow.
43We obtain qualitatively similar ndings for tighter levels of the household borrowing constraint.
44In this model the desire to engage in precautionary saving is driven both by strictly convex marginal utility as well as
potentially binding borrowing constraints. Note however that the borrowing constraint we employ in this example is rather
















































































Figure 5: The eects of public risk sharing in standard incomplete markets
a more dispersed wealth distribution in turn is associated with a consumption distribution with larger vari-
ance and thus a lower extent of private intermediation. Notice for example that in gure 5, for the low value
of  = 0:8 and signicant public intermediation  private intermediation PI turns negative: as the denition
of PI in equation (43) makes clear for this constellation of parameters and government policy the dispersion
of the consumption distribution is larger than the dispersion of the after-tax income distribution. This can
only happen if the distribution of capital income displays a large variance, which in turn requires a large
cross-sectional dispersion in asset holdings. Consistent with this argument in experiments with economies
that feature much tighter borrowing constraints we found, not surprisingly, that the crowding-out eect
is signicantly smaller. With less generous borrowing constraints the long-run asset distribution is more
narrowly bounded and therefore the corresponding consumption distribution is signicantly less dispersed.
We conclude this section by highlighting two additional crucial dierences between the responses to
changes in government intermediation in the two models.
First, although the crowding-out eect of private insurance from public insurance can be substantial even
in the standard incomplete markets model we never found it to be larger than a 100% in any of them many
quantitative examples we considered. Therefore in this model in which the structure of nancial markets
is unaected by government policy (both the set of assets that are being traded as well as the borrowing
constraints are policy-invariant) more public intermediation always leads to better overall consumption
insurance (and consequently to higher ex-ante steady state welfare). We conjecture the reason for this
nding to be the following. In the standard incomplete markets model public and private intermediation
are not perfect substitutes since public intermediation provides state contingent insurance while private
loose (although it is not completely absent as in pure versions of the permanent income model).
31intermediation takes the form of uncontingent self -insurance through borrowing and lending. Thus more
public intermediation always improves the long run consumption risk allocation and hence long run welfare.45
Second the eect of government policy on real interest rates is qualitatively dierent in the limited
commitment and the standard incomplete markets model. In the former more publicly provided risk sharing
cause, in the relevant range of , a reduction in the equilibrium interest rate (see again gure 4, panel
b), because larger  tightens enforcement constraints and hence reduces demand for borrowing. In the
standard incomplete markets economy in contrast the equilibrium interest rate is increasing in government
intermediation (see gure 5, panel b). Higher government intermediation mitigates labor income risk and
thus reduces the precautionary demand for saving which in turn drives down the equilibrium interest rate.
This eect is largely absent in the limited commitment economy, due to the availability of a full set of
state-contingent assets.46
7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a model that highlights a new channel through which the provision of public
income insurance through progressive income taxation endogenously impacts the operation of private nan-
cial markets. By changing the incentives to default on private nancial contracts government policy alters
the extent to which private nancial can provide consumption insurance against after-tax income risk. We
demonstrated that when private labor income insurance markets are active, public risk sharing provided
via taxes crowds out private risk sharing. In order to gain some insights into the potential quantitative
magnitude of this eect we measured the extent of household labor income risk from US household data and
confronted consumers in our model with this risk. In our quantitative example we found that the magnitude
of the crowding-out eect can be very substantial. In fact, for plausible parameterizations of the model an
increase in public risk sharing via the tax system can lead to a more than 100% crowding-out of private
insurance and thus an overall reduction of total consumption risk sharing. By attempting to provide better
consumption insurance the government induces more consumption risk in equilibrium.
In contrast, if private insurance markets are assumed to be missing for model-exogenous reasons (and
thus there is no interaction between the extent of public insurance and the structure of private markets),
as in the standard incomplete markets model developed by Bewley (1986), a tax reform that reduces the
variance of after-tax income serves as am eective partial substitute for private insurance markets and always
increases the amount of consumption risk sharing in the economy. This nding indicates that the assumption
about the exact structure of private capital markets is crucial when analyzing social insurance policies.
45We want to stress that although we experimented with many possible parameters congurations and never have encountered
the crowding-out eect to exceed 100% in the standard incomplete markets model we were not able to obtain a formal theoretical
proof of this result. We therefore think it is conceivable (albeit not very likely, given our numerical results) that, even in the
standard incomplete market model the long-run crowding out of private intermediation from public risk sharing could potentially
exceed 100%.
46Due to the presence of (state-contingent) borrowing constraints in the limited commitment model the precautionary motive
to save is not entirely absent from this model either.
32In order to isolate the eect of the tax system on private insurance markets and on risk sharing as clearly
as possible we focused on comparison of steady state equilibria and abstracted from several features of actual
economies that are potentially important in the analysis of tax policy, most notably its potential distortions of
labor-leisure and capital accumulation decisions as well as its redistributive consequences. A comprehensive
quantitative positive and normative analysis of progressive taxation that incorporate the eects we highlight
in this work into a model featuring these distortions and equity concerns and considers transitional dynamics
is called for, in our view. We defer such analysis to future research.
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35Proof of Lemma 3:
We want to show that for all w  w < ^ w   w; h(w) < h( ^ w): Suppose not. Then from (20) V 0
R(gy0(w)) 
V 0
R(gy0( ^ w)) for all y0 such that gy0( ^ w) > UAut(y0); and hence UAut(y0) < gy0( ^ w)  gy0(w) for all those y0 by
strict convexity of VR: From promise keeping there must exist  y0 such that g y0(w) < g y0( ^ w) = UAut( y0); a
violation of the debt constraint.
Now, since h is strictly increasing in w; C0(h(w)) < C0(h( ^ w)): Suppose that gy0(w) > UAut(y0): Then from
(20) we have V 0
R(gy0(w)) < V 0
R(gy0( ^ w)) and from the strict convexity of VR it follows that gy0( ^ w) > gy0(w):
Obviously, if gy0(w) = UAut(y0) then gy0( ^ w)  gy0(w):
Thus we conclude that either gy0( ^ w) > gy0(w) or gy0(w) = gy0( ^ w) = UAut(y0)
Proof of Lemma 4:
VR is strictly convex and dierentiable. By assumption gy0(w) > UAut(y0): Combining (20) and (21) we
obtain RV 0
R(w) = V 0
R(gy0(w)). Since R < 1
 we have V 0
R(w) > V 0
R(gy0(w)): By strict convexity of VR the
rst result follows. Hence gy0(:) are always strictly below the 450 line in its strictly increasing part. But
gy0(w)  UAut(y0) for all w: Hence for w < UAut(y0) it follows that gy0(w) = UAut(y0) > w: By continuity
of gy0(:) we obtain that gy0(UAut(y0)) = UAut(y0); and from the rst result it follows that gy0(w) < w for all
w > UAut(y0)
Proof of Theorem 5:
Take  w = maxy UAut(y)+"; for " > 0. If gy0(w) > UAut(y0); then the previous Lemma yields the result.
If gy0(w) = UAut(y0); then gy0(w) = UAut(y0)  maxy UAut(y) <  w
Proof of Theorem 6:
We rst prove that there exists w 2 W such that w > UAut(ymax) and gymax(w) = UAut(ymax), from
which it follows that gymax(w) = UAut(y) for all w  w:
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that gymax(w) > UAut(ymax) for all w 2 W;w > UAut(ymax): Then by
Lemma 3 we have gy0(w) = gymax(w); for all y0 2 Y and all w > UAut(ymax): By continuity of gy0 and Lemma
4 we conclude that gy0(UAut(ymax)) = UAut(ymax); for all y0 2 Y: But since UAut(ymax) > UAut(y0) for all
y0 6= ymax; by Lemma 4 it follows that gy0(UAut(ymax)) < UAut(ymax) for all y0 6= ymax; a contradiction.
We now can apply Stokey et al., Theorem 11.12. For this it is sucient to prove there exists an " > 0
and an N  1 such that for all (w;y) 2 (W;Y ) we have QN((w;y;UAut(ymax);ymax)  ":
If w   w this is immediate, as then for all (w;y) 2 (W;Y ); Q((w;y;UAut(ymax);ymax)  (ymax); since
gymax(w) = UAut(ymax) for all w 2 W: So suppose w <  w: Dene
d = min
w2[w;  w]
fw   gymax(w)g (45)
Note that d is well-dened as gymax is a continuous function and that d > 0 from Lemma 4 Dene
N = minfn 2 Nj  w   nd  wg (46)
and " = (ymax)N: Suppose an individual receives ymax for N times in a row, an event that occurs with
probability ": For (w;y) such that w  w the result is immediate as for those w;gymax(w) = UAut(ymax) and
gymax(UAut(ymax)) = UAut(ymax): For any w 2 (w;  w] we have gymax(w)  w  d; gymax(gymax(w))  w  2d;
etc. The result then follows by construction of (N;")
Proof of Lemma 9: We rst show that there is an allocation attaining a distribution of utility that
stochastically dominates the utility distribution in autarky and requires no more resources. It is then
immediate that autarky is not ecient. In autarky the measure over utility entitlements and endowment
shocks is given by
Aut(fUAut(y);yg) = (y) (47)
36We show that there exist allocations that attain the joint measure ^  dened as
^ (fUAut(y);yg) = (y) all y 6= ymin
^ (fUAut(ymin);yming) = (ymin)(1   (ymax))
^ (f ~ w;yming) = (ymin)(ymax) (48)
where ~ w = UAut(ymin) + " for small " > 0: Dene max and min implicitly by




UAut(ymax) = (1   )(u(ymax)   max) + 
X
y6=ymin
(y)UAut(y) + (ymin) ~ w
(49)









The autarkic allocation exhausts all resources. The new allocation reduces consumption for the (ymax)
agents with ymax by max and increases consumption for (ymax)(ymin) agents by min: Hence, compared
to the autarkic allocation the change in resource requirements is given by

















Under this condition the new allocation is resource feasible, incentive feasible and attains ^ ; a distribution
that dominates Aut: It is straightforward to construct the sequential allocation h induced by the recursive
policies supporting ^ : By reducing h0(UAut(ymin);ymin) so that the agents receiving discounted utility ^ w
under ^  receive UAut(ymin) the new allocation attains Aut but with less resources, a contradiction to the
assumption that autarky is constrained ecient.
Proof of Theorem 12
The allocation satises the resource constraint (9) since the ecient allocation does and 0 is derived from
0: Also the allocation satises the continuing participation constraints, and, by construction of a0(w0;y0);
the budget constraint. It remains to be shown that fct(a0;yt)g is utility maximizing among the allocations











A = (a0;y0)p(yt) (53)
are sucient for consumer optimality.47 Dene Lagrange multipliers (a0;y0) = 0; (a0;y0) = (1  
47The consumer maximization problem is a strictly convex programming problem (the constraint set with the debt
constraints remains convex). Note that since the ecient consumption allocation is bounded from above, the ex-









Note that the allocation by construction (see 33) satises
u
0(ct(a0;y0))
Ru0(ct+1(a0;yt+1))  1, with equality if the limited
enforcement constraint is not binding: Hence (a0;yt+1)  0 and (a0;yt+1) = 0 if the constraint is not
binding. By construction the allocation and multipliers satisfy the rst order conditions.
pected continuation utility from any history yT onward, discounted at market prices R T goes to zero as T ! 1
(i.e. the relevant transversality condition is satised). For details see the separate theoretical appendix, available at
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/research/theoreticalapp.pdf.
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